


/^^^ 



"Tiiavier V u- ^ 



'(From The Monist, October, 1922.) 



A COMPARISON OF THE ETHICAL PHILOSO- 
PHIES OF SPINOZA AND HOBBES 

IF ONE could believe that a philosophical system ema- 
nates full-fledged from the mind of a single thinker, 
as Athene from the head of Zeus, he might venture to 
decide the extent to which one philosopher is indebted to 
another for the elements of his system. But, in point of 
fact, the task of awarding credit where credit is due varies 
directly in magnitude with the quantity of literary remains 
of the age under investigation. For philosophies originate 
out of the vague and ill-defined thoughts of multitudes of 
individuals. When a Plato or a Hobbes ultimately gives 
clearly and distinctly a systematic and classic expression 
to what previously existed more as an attitude than a way 
of life, more as a mood and a feeling than as a logical and 
intellectual formulation, we quite properly give homage. 
But as our acquaintance with the environment giving birth 
to this expression becomes more detailed and intimate, the 
more keenly do we realize that our Plato or our Hobbes 
has succeeded in stating better, more clearly, more con- 
sistently and more forcibly what weaker minds strove to 
convey. Indeed, it seems that philosophers like inventors 
build upon the trials and errors of their predecessors and 
contemporaries. 

Consequently, we shall not attempt to determme pre- 
cisely how far Spinoza is indebted to Hobbes, although 
we know he read him thoroughly. Some critics are so 



K^-MX^ /l/-u^r-v-< 



t 



r 




rash as to consider Spmoza no more than a disciple of * 
Hobbes, while, on the other hand, Duff, who has produced I 1 3. A. 
one of the most complete and careful studies thus far made 
of Spinoza's political philosophy, contends that Spinoza 
follows St. Paul more than Hobbes, and states, "a deeper 
influence than that of Hobbes was exercised by Hobbes'* 
master, Machiavelli." "^ Duff's study, together with Pol- 
lock^s excellent com.parison of Hobbes and Spinoza, fur- 
nishes us with a thorough contrast of their political phil- 
osophies. 

Our interest here is primarily in their moral philoso- 
phies, but since politics is one application of ethics, we 
shall have to treat of their political views in so far as 
these throw light upon their moral programs. 

A suggestive approach to a study of the differences 
and similarities in the ethics of Hobbes and Spinoza is 
found in their opinions regarding the function of the state. 
According to Hobbes, one motive prompts men to insti- 
tute a state — fear. The state of nature is a condition of 
war. Each man seeks to realize his desires, to enhance 
his power, and in so doing conflicts with others bent upon 
a like object, and the liberty {Jus Naturale), which he has 
"to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preser- 
vation of his own Nature"^ and thus to appropriate the 
goods and services of other men is scant compensation for 
the dangers thus entailed. 'Tn such condition, there is 
no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncer- 
tain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Navi- 
gation, nor use of the comtnodities that may be imported 
by Sea ; no commodious Building ; no Instruments of mov- 
ing, and removing such things as require much force; no 
Knowledge of the face of the Earth ; no account of Time ; 
no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of 

^ Spinoza's Political and Ethical Phlosophy, p. 6. 
^Leviathan (Everyman Edition), Ch. 14, pp. 66. 






all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and tlie 
life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,"* 

Fear prompts reason to devise a condition ot peace. 
, . . "As long as this naturall Right of everyman to 
every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man 
(how strong or wise soever he be), of living out the time, 
which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And con- 
sequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, That 
every rnmi, ought to endeavor Peace, as farre as he has 
hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, 'hat 
he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of IVarre. 
The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first and 
Fundamental! Law of Nature ; which is, to seek Peace and 
follozv it. The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; 
which is, By alt means we can, to defend our selves,^' * 

The motive then for establishing the state is lear, and 
the end sought is individual self-preservation. It man 
could live an ideal life, it would be, for Hobbes, a state of 
absolute subjection of others and absence of impediments 
to the desires of self. The absolute ruler most nearly 
embodies this ideal, for he alone enjoys the services of 
others without obligation to repa}^ in kind. The average 
citizen, however, endures the state as a necessary evil. He 
assisted in its origin and helps to sustain it in order to 
avoid the worst possible calamity, a relapse into the state 
of nature. The contract then which creates the state is 
a renunciation of certain liberties or rights in return for 
protection and the liberty to gratify other desires. Nor 
does Hobbes believe he contradicts himself when he insists 
that in the event of a conflict between individual judgment 
and that of the monarch, the former shall yield. Tiie indi- 
vidual must yield, he insists, because orignally he agreed 
to place the making of decisions in the hands of the state, 

3 Ibid., Ch. 13, p. 65. 
*/6id., Ch. 14, p. 67. 



and, further, should men follow their own opinions society 
would disintegrate, and revert once more to "a warre, as^ 
is of every man, against every man." 

The function of the state, as Hobbes views it, is thus- 
essentially negative. i\s against anarchy or absolutism 
man selects the lesser of two evils — absolutism. And the 
laws of nature, which Hobbes calls the precepts or general 
rules of Reason, he sums up in a negative statement of 
the Golden Rule: ''Do not that to another, which thou 
wouldest not have done to thy selfe."^ Security is found 
in obeying the law, but a truly thoughtful and reasonable 
man must surely balance constantly in his mind the advan- 
tages of conformity to law as against a realization of 
his own desires. 

Spinoza conceives the state otherwise. It is true there 
is a semblance of Hobbes in his account of its origin, for 
release from fear is one of the motives he mentions. But 
whereas Spinoza insists that at best fear is a poor motive, 
a passion in the individual, and a constant danger to the 
security of the state, Hobbes believes that life is never 
without fear,^ and "the terrour of some Power" is the per- 
manent basis of the commonwealth.^ Hobbes, to be sure, 
realizes the advantages of co-operative endeavor, but for 
vSpinoza mutual aid is the ultimate justification for social 
organizations and the indispensable means of realizing 
man's true happiness. Thus he writes in the Theologico- 
Political Treatise: "The formation of society serves not 
only for defensive purpose, but is also very useful, and, 
indeed, absolutely necessary, as rendering possible the 
division of labor. If men did not render mutual assistance 
to each other, no one would have either the skill or the 
time to provide for his own sustenance and preservation: 
for all men are not equally apt for all work, and no one 

f^Ibid., Ch. 15, p. 82. 
« Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 30. 
^ Ibid., Ch. 17. 



would be capable of preparing- all that he individually stood 
in need of. Strength and time, I repeat, would fail, if 
every one had in person to plough, to sow, to reap, to grind 
corn, to cook, to weave, to stitch, and perform the numer- 
ous functions required to keep life going; to say nothing 
of the arts and sciences which are also entirely necessary 
to the perfection and blessedness of human nature. We 
see that peoples living in uncivilized barbarism lead a 
wretched and almost animal life, and even they would not 
be able to acquire their few rude necessaries without assist- 
ing one another to a certain extent."* And again, when 
discussing the foundations of the state: "Nevertheless, 
no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live accord- 
ing to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we 
said, they have men's true good for their object. More- 
over, everyone wishes to live as far as possible securely 
beyond the reach of fear, and this would be quite impos- 
sible so long as everyone did everything he liked, and rea- 
son's claim lowered to a par with those of hatred and 
anger; there is no one who is not ill at ease in the midst 
of enmiity, hatred, anger and deceit, and who does not 
seek to avoid them as much as he can. When we reflect 
that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must 
needs live most miserably, as we clearly proved in Chapter 
V, we shall plainly see that men must necessarily come to 
an agreement to live together as securely and well as pos- 
sible if they are to enjoy as a whole the rights which natur- 
ally belong to them as individuals, and their life should be 
no more conditioned by the force and desire of individuals, 
but by the power and will of the whole body. This end 
they will be unable to attain if desire be their only guide 
(for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a different 
direction) ; they must, therefore, most firmly decree and 
establish that they will be guided in everything by reason 

8 Works (Bohn Edition), Vol. I, p. 73. 



(which nobody will dare openly to repudiate lest he should 
be taken for a madman), and will restrain any desire which 
ife ifftjurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to all as 
the}^ would be done by, and that they will defend their 
neighbour's rights as their own/'^ 

Spinoza saw clearly wherein he differed from Hobbes, 
and he states in a note to Chapter i6 of the Theologico- 
Political Treatise: "Now reason (though Hobbes thinks 
otherwise) is always on the side of peace, which caimot be 
attained unless the general laws of the state be respected." ''^ 
And in Part IV of the Ethics, he writes, "Now, :f men 
lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain 
in possession of this his right (his natural right) without 
any injury to his neighbour/'" That is, whereas FTobbes 
considers the desires and wants of men inevitably bring 
them into conflict, Spinoza insists that it is only passion,, 
the irrational and ill-informed opinions of their wants^ 
which lead men 'to disagree. The true needs of men are 
in harmony and are realizable most fully in society. The 
state, for Spinoza, as for Hobbes, is a necessary evil; but 
ft'is a necessary evil, according to Spiiioza, only because 
and in so far as it must resort to means which are a poor 
substitute for rational behavior'. "Wherefore, in order 
that men may live together in harmony, and may aid one 
another, it is necessary that they should forego their 
natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain from 
all actions which can injure their fellowmen. The way in 
which this end can be attained, so that men who are neces- 
sarily a' prey to their emotions (IV., iv. Coroll.), incon- 
stant, and diverse, should be able to render each other 
mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from 
IV.; vii. and III.,' XXXIX. It is there shown, that an 
emotion can only be restrained by an emotion stronger 

«Ibid., Vol. I, p. 202. 

1^ That is, of course, the laws of a democratic state. 

^^ Ethics, IV, Prop. 37, note 2. 



tlian, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting 
injury themselves." ^^ 

The best state then would be one which governs ration- 
ally; that is, one which establishes laws enabling- men to 
develop and expand the potentialities of their nature. Con- 
sequently Spinoza opposes an absokitism and favors a dem- 
ocracy. '"Tn a democracy, irrational commands are still 
less feared: for it is impossible that the majority of a 
people, especially if it be a large one, should agree in an 
irraf^'^nal design: and, moreover, the basis and aim of a 
democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and to bring 
men as far as possible under the control of reason, so that 
they may live in peace and harmony: if this basis be re- 
moved the whole fabric falls to ruin."^'^ As a necessary 
means to rational legislation, Spinoza pleads for the utmost 
freedom of thought and speech, distinguishing sharply be- 
tween obedience to law and the expression of opinions re- 
garding the wisdom of particular legislation.^* "No," he 
exclaims passionately, "the object of government is not to 
change men from rational beings into beasts or puppets^ 
but to enable them to develop their minds and bodies in 
security, and to employ their reason unshackled; neither 
showing hatred, anger, deceit, nor watched with ihe eyes 
of jealousy and injustice. In fact, the true aim of govern- 
ment is liberty." ^^ ^ ^ 
')' A difiference in conception'as to the function of the state 
carries with it a corresponding disagreement as to the 
nature and purpose of the individual. But here again, on 

12 Ibid., IV, Prop. 37, note 2. " ' 

' 13 Theologico-P olitiical Treatise. Works, Vol." I, p. 206. 

1* See Ch. 20 of the Theologico-P olitical Treatise. A comparison of this 
chapter in Spinoza with chapter 29 in Hobbes' Leviathan, "Of those things that 
Weaken, or tend to the DISSOLUTION of a Common-wealth," will reveal 
the gap separating the two men. Contrasting what Hobbes has to say about the' 
reading of the ancient writers with this title page of Spinoza's treatise : "Where- 
in is set forth that freedom of thought and speech not only may, without prej a- 
dice to piety and the public peace, be granted ; but also may not, without danger 
to piety and the public peace, be withheld." 

1^ Theologico-P oUitical Treatise. Works, Vol. I, p. 259. 



first reading, Spinoza seems to repeat Hobbes. Reason, 
says Hobbes, ''is nothing but Reckoning." ^^ And it is no 
more than a reckoning of consequences in terms of per- 
sonal self-preservation, enhancement of vital motion and 
increase in power. Spinoza seems essentially to repeat 
Hobbes when he writes, ''it is the sovereign law and right 
of nature that each individual should endeavor to preserve 
itself as it is, without regard to anything but itself." ^^ And 
again, "... in no case do we strive for, wish for, long 
for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, 
but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because 
we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it." ^* 

But it is no mere repetition of Hobbes, for Spinoza 
does not mean the same thing by reason, nor is his indi- 
vidual an insulated atom. Hobbes considers that reason 
recognizes little in common between men, nor does it seek 
to ascertain their mutual welfare. It serves rather to 
gratify the possessive impulses and to obtain individual 
advantage. When contrasting man with the bees and ants 
whose "Common good differeth not from the Private," 
Hobbes points out that "man, whose Joy consisteth in com- 
paring himself with other men, can relish nothing but 
what is eminent." ^^ Spinoza, however, believes that rea- 
son frees man from an isolated and miserable condition 
and in operating according to notions common to all men, 
it contributes to their m.utual welfare. The rational life 
unites man to man. In the state of nature man has a 
natural right to gratify any and all desires, but this state 
of nature is not something actually prior to and apart from 
a social medium. The state of nature is merely a condi- 
tion of subjection to passion and ignorance. Natural right 
means no more than a natural tendency to act under certain 

^® Leviathan, Ch. 5, p. 18. 

^■^ Theoloyico-Political Treatise. Works, Vol. I, p. 200. 

i« Ethics, III, Prop. 9, note. 

i» Leviathan, Ch. 17, p. 88. 



conditions. Consequently, to say, *'the ignorant and fool- 
ish man has sovereign right to do all that desire dictates, 
or to live according to desire," just as "the wise man has 
sovereign right to do all that reason dictates,"^" is not to 
undermine sound morality; it is merely to say that if one 
lacks reason and is ruled by passion, he can act only in 
accordance with passion. Reason frees man from this 
hopeless state. It enables him neither to exploit another, 
nor to realize his desires at the expense of others — as it 
can very well do for Hobbes. As Spinoza conceives it, 
"men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, neces- 
sarily do only such things as are necessarily good for 
human nature, and consequently for each individual 
man." ^^ Reason thus supplies us with a criterion by means 
of which we can select those activities which at once aid 
us and assist others. Reason breaks down man's isolation ; 
Hobbes' individual remains forever apart from others. In 
short, that deplorable state which Spinoza calls passion, 
the bondage of man, from which reason frees him, is for 
Hobbes the permanent condition of man. Human reason 
may, according to Spinoza, succeed in inaugurating an 
era of good will. Life, for Hobbes, is always a pugilistic 
encounter, and the best reason can do is to substitute 
gloves, a referee, and Queensbury rules for bare fists and 
go it as you please until the first man drops. 

This difference in ultimate purpose applies as well to 
their conceptions of self-preservation. For each self-pre- 
servation is an increase in power, and power is stimulation 
of vital activity. Pleasure and pain, Hobbes defines in 
terms of motion. ^^ But Spinoza will not object to describ- 
ing emotions as modifications of Extension. He merely 
insists that we remember (what Hobbes denies) that vital 
motion and a thought activity are two aspects of one and 

20 Theologico-P olitical Treatise, Vol. I, p. 201. 

21 Ethics, IV, Prop. 35, demonstration. 

22 Leviathan, Ch. 6. 



the same thing.^* Had Spinoza chosen to treat emotion in 
the language appropriate to the Attribute ol Extension he 
would not have profoundly disagreed with these statements 
from Hobbes: "The Endeavor, when it is toward some- 
thing which causes it, is called Appetite or Desire/' "And 
when the Endeavor is fromward something, it is generally 
called Aversion."^* It is only when we inquire of each, 
"What is the final goal of endeavor, the ultimate end of 
self-preservation?" that we receive profoundly different 
replies. 

Hobbes denies outright the existence of a Summum 
Bonum and contends, "that the Felicity of this life, con- 
sisteth not in the repose of a m.ind satisfied." ^^ "Continuall 
succ'esse in obtaining those things which a man froni time 
to time desireth, that is to say, continuall prospering, is 
that men call Felicity ; I mean the Felicity of this life. For 
there is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquility of mind, 
while we live here; because Life it selfe is but Motion, 
aiid ckn never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no 
more than without Sense." ^^ "So that in the first place, 
I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall 
and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth" 
oriely'in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that' 
a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has 
already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a 
moderate power; but because he cannot assure the power 
and means to live well, which he hath present, without the 
acquisition of more."^^ Carried out logically, this means 
that might makes right. The strongest desire, in the sense 
of the most vigorous and permanent desire, is the right 
desir'^ in the individual's soul, as the strongest arm is the 
morally justified arbitrator of relations between men. We 

23 Ethics, II, Prop. 7. 

24 Leviathan, Ch. 6, p. 23. 

25 Ibid., Ch. II, p. 49. 

26 Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 30. 

27 Ibid., Ch. II, pp. 49-50. 

10 



have observed above that the conflicts between men's inter- 
ests necessitates the organization of the state; but the de- 
crees of the state are right only because and only so long 
as the state can enforce its decisions. Hobbes calls upon 
no man to lay down his life for a lost cause. Self-preser- 
vation is the first and the last duty. "If a Monarch sub- 
dued by war, render himselfe Subject to the Victor; his 
Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and 
become obliged to the Victor." ^* Right is the interest 'of 
the stronger. Such is the conclusion which Hobbes con- 
siders to be the dictates of reason. • , 

Reason for Spinoza speaks a different tongue. We 
have already indicated that Spinoza considers natural law 
to be no more than a description of things as they are in 
the absence of organized relations between men. Natural 
right. is not right in a moral sense. And when Spinoza 
states that "the law and ordinance of nature, und^r whicji 
all men are born, and for the most part live, forbids.notfi- 
ing but, what no one wishes or is able to do and is not 
opposed to strifes, hatre.d,, anger, treachery, or, in general, 
anything appetite suggests," ^® he speaks not of what ought 
to be; he merely describes s, fact. The laws of nature and 
natural rights are descriptions of conditions, not suggested 
programs for action. Spinoza's insistence upon viewing 
men's vices and imperfections dispassionately and scien- 
'tifically should not blind, us to his acceptance of right as 
an ideal, and as ^, valid, objective moral standard. Right 
is the reasonable. The right act involves in it more per- 
fection and more power than a wrong act. In his stu(Jy 
of human nature he means, "by *good' that which we cer- 
tainly know, to be a means of approaching more nearly to 
the type of human nature, which we have set before our- 
selves ; by *bad,' that which we certainly know to be a hin- 
drance to us in approaching the said type. . Again, .w,e 

^^Ibid., Ch. 21, p. 117. ' ' ■ 

29 Political Treatise. Works, Vol. I, p. 294. 

11 



shall say that men are more perfect, or more imperfect, in 
proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the 
said type." '" 

We have seen that Spinoza conceives the rational life 
as a social life, the life of co-operative endeavor and har- 
monious relations with one's fellows. Consequently the 
impulse towards self-preservation which, in Hobbes' 
opinion, sanctions and renders inevitable a personal 
aggrandisement and increase in power, becomes in Spine 
za's ethics social action and the chief principle of social 
solidarity. If we act upon Hobbes' convictions we shall 
never transcend the selfish act; but if we heed Spinoza, 
in passing from passion to active emotion, we shall trans- 
form selfishness into altruistic action. 

Indeed, as Spinoza conceives it, true happiness is found 
only when men act in accordance with rational endeavor. 
When he points the way to human freedom he insists, as 
the first condition of emancipation from passion, that we 
transform a passion into an active emotion, and this we 
may do by securing a clear and distinct idea of it. Thus, 
he writes in the note to Proposition 4 of Part V of the 
Ethics: "To attain this result, therefore (freedom from 
passion), we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, 
as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every 
emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, 
be determined to think of those things which it clearly and 
distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and 
thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the 
thought of an external cause, and may be associated with 
true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that 
love, hatred, etc., will be destroyed (V. ii), but also that 
the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such 
emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV., 
Ixi). For it must be especially remarked, that the appe- 
ar Ethics, IV, Preface. 

12 



tite through which a man is said to be active, and through 
which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For 
instance, we have shown that human nature is so consti- 
tuted, that everyone desires his fellowmen to live after his 
own fashion (III., xxxi. note) ; in a man, who is not 
guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called 
ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride ; whereas 
in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activ- 
ity or virtue which, is called piety (IV. xxxvii. note i. and 
second proof). In like manner, all appetites or desires 
are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate 
ideas; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they 
are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all de- 
sires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may 
arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV. 
lix)."^^ 

Consequently, the impulse for self-preservation, which, 
in Hobbes' system, forever condemns the individual to "a 
perpetuall and restless desire of Power after power, that 
ceaseth only in Death," develops quite otherwise for 
Spinoza. On the plane of Imaginative Knowledge and of 
passion alone does it oppose self-interest to the good of 
others. When the impulse expands into active emotion 
and Rational Knowledge it leads to co-operative relations 
between men. Says Spinoza : "There are then many thing v. 
outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, there- 
fore, to be desired. Of such none can be discerned more 
excellent, than those which are in entire agreement with 
our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely 

21 We should remember, however, that for Spinoza there is no distinction 
in kind between reason and passion. The idea of the good for him is merely 
the conscious aspect of an activity. When the activity gets its explanation from 
external objects acting upon the individual, it is passion. When it is self- 
directive activity it is active emotion. The increase in knowledge is not so 
much a cause for the transition from passion to active emotion as a description 
of the fact. In other words, Spinoza's doctrine of the necessary character of 
the universe robs the individual of genuine initiative and fundamentally ren- 
ders inexplicable how on one's own account he can win freedom. 

13 



the same nature are united, they form a combination twice 
as powerful as either of them singly. 

"Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than 
man — nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their 
being can be wished for by men, than that all should in all 
points agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, 
as it were, one single mind and one single body, and that 
all should, with one consent as far as they are able, en- 
deavor to preserve their being, and all with one consent 
seek what is useful to them all. Hence men, who are gov- 
erned by reason — that is, who seek what is useful to them 
in accordance with reason — desire for themselves noth- 
ing, which they do not also desire for the rest of man- 
kind, and consequently, are just, faithful, and honorable 
in their conduct.^' ^^ 

Spinoza's impulse of self-preservation leads men dif- 
ferently from the way Hobbes describes not merely be- 
cause, in Spinoza's ethics, egoism, as the last quotation 
might suggest, is more farseeing than in Hobbes. In a 
measure such is the case. But Spinoza literally believes 
we gain our life by losing it. In so far as we live the life 
of reason we identify ourselves with God and thereby with 
what is permanent and common in all men. The distinc- 
tions which mark off man from man disappear, and as 
'*the bases of reason are the notions which answer to 
things common to all,"^^ so the essence of individuality 
that remain when passion broadens out into active emo- 
tion is the force which "follows from the eternal neces- 
sity of God's nature." ^* "Whatsoever wt conceive in this 
second way as true or real, we conceive under the form 
of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite 
essence of God.''^'' 

82 Ethics, IV, Prop. 18, note. 

*8 Ethics, II, Prop. 44, Coroll. 2, demonstration. 

84 Ethics. II. Prop. 45. note. 

86 Ethics, V, Prop. 29, note. 

14 



And so the impulse of self-preservation properly leads 
man into the rational life. Only as a rational being does 
he increase his power and arrive at true independence. 
"Nay, inasmuch as human power is to be reckoned less by 
physical vigor than by mental strength, it follows that 
those men are most independent whose reason is strongest, 
and who are most guided thereby. And so I am altogether 
for calling a man free, as he is led by reason; because so 
far he is determined to action by such causes, as can be 
adequately understood by his unassisted nature, although 
by these causes he be necessarily determined to action." ^® 

Thus right, for Spinoza, is no moral justification of 
things as the}^ are, although it does imply an acquiescence 
of spirit. But the acquiescence of spirit which the free 
man possesses is a loyalty to an ideal which, as it were, 
transcends the environment in which he finds himself. He 
does not take advantage of the weaknesses of others, nor 
does he submit to the false valuations which chance to con- 
trol the social environment in which he lives. He renders 
back "love or kindness for other men's hatred, anger, con- 
tempt." ^^ Courteously and kindly he tries to lead others 
by reason,^* and should he fail, he accepts the situation 
stoically, conscious of its eternal necessity, and "endeavors, 
as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good and to 
go on his way rejoicing." ^^ 

We may conclude, then, that Spinoza and Hobbes 
speak quite differently regarding the function of the state» 
regarding the ideal social order, the nature and destiny of 
the individual, the place of reason in human life, and in 
the character and ultimate purpose of the impulse for self- 
preservation. Their relation is not that of master and dis- 
ciple. If we may take an illustration from industrial life, 

8® Political Treatise. Works, Vol. I, p. 295. 

3"^ Ethics, IV, Prop. 46. 

88 Ethics, IV, Prop. 37. 

^^ Ethics, IV, Prop. 73, note. 

15 




we might say that Spinoza's relation to HobL..®. 02_0„20_7 221 5 f 
a manufacturer to the producer of his raw materials. 
Hobbes supplies the raw produce, Spinoza makes it over 
into a new and original article. 

Their disagreements find an explanation in the meta- 
physical backgrounds of the two men. Hobbes is a mechani- 
cal empiricist, Spinoza is a rationahst. Spinoza cannot 
admit that the individual is other than an expression of a 
deeper and more fundamental reality. Each individual, 
as he sees it, testifies in a unique way to the boundless and 
infinite possibilities of Substance ; but Substance is an im- 
manent Energy. Man is Substance and Substance is man. 
In God and in God alone man lives and moves and has his 
being. Consequently, in identifying his personal ends with 
the highest good of his fellows, man approaches to the 
supreme ethical ideal, *'a knowledge of the union existing 
between the mind and the whole of nature." *' Hence, the 
fragmentary and short-sighted character, as Spinoza must 
see'^it, of Hobbes' individualism. It is true only as a de- 
scription of man's condition of bondage ; and it has value 
only as it enables him to escape into the life of reason. Its 
truth is merely the truth of Imaginative Knowledge 
Hence, it lacks ultimate validity both as a description of 
human relations as they really are, and as a program for 
attaining to a state of blessedness. 

V. T. Thayer. 
Ethical Culture School, New York. 



rn. 



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*o Improvement of the Understanding. Works, Vol. H, p. 6. 

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